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This paper discusses some puzzles in the contemporary macroeconomic scene in India, from the 
perspective of public finance and economic development. These include a fiscal deficit higher 
than it was during the 1991 crisis, but without a large current account deficit or rise in inflation 
or interest rates, a rising inflow of external capital, accompanied by the RBI’s sterilizing these 
inflows and accumulating large reserves, even in the face of low inflation. We offer a critique of 
some previous analyses, and some models that are suggestive of how real and monetary factors 
might be integrated in providing a firmer grounding for the policy debates current in India. 
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  The contemporary macroeconomic scene in India is a puzzle from the perspectives of 
public finance and development.  Consider the following facts.  First, the consolidated gross 
fiscal deficit (GFD) of central and state governments was 10.3% of GDP in 2001-02, around 
10.1% in 2002-03 according to revised estimates, and budgeted at 9.1% in 2003-04 (RBI 2003, 
Table 2.23 and RBI 2004, Tables 2.19 and 2.26, allowing for consolidation of state and central 
budgets).  The revised estimates for 2003-04 show that the central deficit has fortunately fallen 
from its budgeted value of 5.6% of GDP to 4.8%, and it is budgeted to fall further to 4.4% in 
2004-05 (Finance Minister’s speech presenting the Interim Budget, February 3, 2004).  
Nonetheless, even with this welcome fall, the consolidated GFD in 2003-04 is likely to exceed 
the 9.4% ratio to GDP reached in the crisis year, 1990-91.  If we add net losses of public sector 
enterprises, off-budget items and the flow equivalent of contingent liabilities, the deficit figures 
will be much higher.  The combined total debt of center and states was budgeted at 76.9% of 
GDP in 2003-04 in comparison to 61.7% in 1990-91.   
Second, and in contrast, external debt to national income fell from 28.7% in 1990 to 
21.0% in 2001, and the proportion of short-term to total external debt (to total gold and foreign 
                                                 
∗ We are grateful to Deepak Lal for very useful comments that helped us to clarify and sharpen our exposition. No 
doubt there are still shortcomings, and we alone are responsible for these. We also thank Marcy Kaufman for 
excellent assistance in preparing the manuscript. 
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exchange reserves) also fell from 10.2% (365.4%) to 2.8% (5.4%) (RBI 2004, Tables 2.5, 7.12 
and 7.14).  The stock of reserves, which had hovered just about $1 billion (less than two weeks 
worth of imports) between April and August of 1991 during the crisis, began its steady climb 
soon after.  The rate of accumulation accelerated since 1999-2000, and the stock reached $119 
billion in early May 2004.   
Third, the balance of payments on the current account has been in surplus, though by a 
small amount (less than 0.5% of GDP) for three years in succession starting in 2001-02.  Fourth, 
annual growth rate of real GDP, having peaked at 7.8% in 1996-97, has slowed down and 
fluctuated since then.  It reached a low of 4.0% in the severe drought year of 2002-03 (‘quick 
estimates’).  The good monsoon in 2004 has led to a recovery and the advance estimate of the 
growth rate is 8.1% (CSO 2004).  Even if an 8.1% growth rate is reached, a simple average 
growth rate during 1997-98 to 2003-04 will only be 5.6%, as compared to an average of 6.7% 
during the first five years (1992-93 – 1997-98) after reforms were initiated.  However, gross 
capital formation as a proportion of GDP in current (constant) prices averaged 24.8% (25.0%) in 
the first period and 23.8% (25.9%) in the second period.  Thus, although real capital formation 
on an average was higher by nearly 2% in the second period, average growth was slower.  Fifth, 
inflation rates, as measured by any of the price indices, have been low since the mid-nineties and 
so have interest rates. 
  Prima facie, these facts are puzzling.  First, although the GFD is even higher than it was 
during the 1991 crisis, it has not been associated, as it was then, with a large current account 
deficit or rise in inflation or interest rates.  Second, although some external credit rating agencies 
have downgraded Indian debt instruments to near junk bond status, such downgrading and the 
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high fiscal deficit seem to have had little effect on the confidence of external investors; the 
inflow of external capital has been rising.   
Third, running a current account surplus does not make sense since, as a developing 
country, presumably with opportunities for high yielding investments, India should be running a 
current account deficit financed by sustained capital inflows.  Fourth, the RBI has been 
sterilizing foreign capital inflows and accumulating reserves to levels that prima facie appear too 
large relative to what would be needed to smooth shocks to export earnings and import 
expenditures and to provide (self) insurance against possible financial crisis, given that capital 
controls continue.
1  Since inflation has been low by historical standards, sterilization for the 
purpose of containing inflationary pressures is not convincing.  It is hard to say the rupee will 
appreciate to such an extent as to hurt exports in the short and medium run and to raise trade 
deficits.  The fact that part of the reserves accumulated have been used to prepay debt suggests 
that the policy makers cannot see ways of investing these resources in the economy so as to earn 
a return higher than the rate of interest on debt.
2   
Fifth, reduction in financial repression and freeing of interest rates apparently have had 
little effect on household financial saving, which rose marginally from a simple average of 
10.2% of GDP at current prices during 1992-93 – 1996-97 to 10.8% during 1997-98 to 2002-03, 
while direct saving in the form of physical assets rose significantly from 8% of GDP to 10.7% 
during the same period.  Given household savings are estimated as residuals and fluctuate quite a 
bit, we do not wish to overemphasize these differences.  Still, it is a bit odd that savings in the 
                                                 
1 An informal case for reserve accumulation based on self-insurance motives and for its signaling role is provided by 
Kapur and Patel (2003). Joshi and Sanyal (2004) appear to support this view, though they explicitly state that the 
reserves to imports ratio is now high enough (based on a rule of thumb argument) and should not be further 
increased. 
2 Joshi and Sanyal (2004, p. 34) implicitly assume something similar, when they state, “policymakers must urgently 
consider how to utilize the continuing inflows productively.”  
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form of physical assets went up and financial savings did not after the freeing of interest rates or 
deposits. 
  The recent literature has focused largely on three issues.  The first is whether or not the 
current level of public debt is sustainable without a major fiscal correction, and the related one of 
apparent lack of signs of a looming financial crisis in spite of India’s macroeconomic indicators 
being, in fact, similar to or worse than in those countries which did experience a crisis.  The 
second is whether or not more productive private investment was crowded out by fiscal deficits.  
The third is whether instead of sterilizing external capital inflows and accumulating reserves, had 
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) let the inflows be absorbed and rupee appreciate, would the 
growth rate of the economy have been significantly higher in the last few years.  On the first 
issue, several papers were presented at a conference (January 15-16, 2004) sponsored by the 
National Institute for Fiscal Policy (NIPF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).   
A paper by Lal, Bery and Pant (2003a), hereafter LBP, addresses the second and third 
issues.  An earlier version, LBP (2003b) of the paper elicited a number of comments and the 
authors (LBP 2003c) have responded to their critics.  LBP use essentially two models.  The first 
is the so-called Australian Dependent Economy real model of a small open economy with three 
commodities (an exportable, an importable and a non-traded good, with the first two combined 
into a Hicksian composite traded good
3) and two factors (capital and labour).  The second is a 
model of Lal, Bhide and Vasudevan (2001) involving nominal variables, such as money supply 
                                                 
3 For a small open economy, the world price of importable relative to that of exportable is determined in world 
markets and is assumed to be constant.  The domestic relative price is also constant, given an ad valorem tariff on 
the importable.  With relative prices constant, one can construct a Hicksian composite traded good using either the 
domestic or international relative price.  The creation of the composite is unnecessary for algebraic analysis, but it is 
convenient for illustration through two-dimensional diagrams.  However, in doing so, one has to be clear whether a 
unit of a domestic or world price-based composite is depicted on one of the axes. 
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and nominal bonds.  This model is not fully described in the paper.
4  In addition, LBP invoke 
macroeconomic accounting identities.  LBP go back and forth between real effects of alternative 
policies on growth and relative prices and nominal effects, such as on inflation, nominal 
exchange rates, price level, etc. 
Unfortunately, the real and monetary models of LBP are not integrated.
5  For example, 
the preferences of consumers in the real model depend only on their consumption of the two 
commodities, and their decisions regarding the demand for money and other nominal assets, 
including bonds, which presumably are features of the nominal model, apparently have no 
influence on these real consumption decisions.  The real model is useful for comparing the real 
effects of absorbing or not absorbing the real inflow.  But one cannot use it for comparing the 
effects of sterilizing inflows with those of not sterilizing them.  These are policies that affect 
nominal variables of money supply and bonds.  As we show in Section 2, incorporating 
consumer demand for money even in a very simple transactions-demand form makes a 
difference in determining how the decision to let real external flows be absorbed or not affects 
relative prices and inflation.  We also argue below that sterilization is not equivalent to non-
absorption. 
As we state in our paper (Singh and Srinivasan, 2004) for the NIPF-IMF conference, 
which drew upon other papers of the conference, one needs a coherent intertemporal model that 
incorporates the real and monetary sectors of the economy and that fits Indian data well for 
                                                 
4 An earlier paper by Lal (1989) provides a model with real and monetary factors considered simultaneously.  
However, money demand in this model is not derived from any behavioral postulates. In fact, the demand for money 
appears to be an asset demand, requiring intertemporal considerations. This feature is combined with a static real 
model, but without allowing for real variables to affect money demand, as would happen in any integrated 
optimization model. Hence, this paper is subject to the same criticism as LBP. 
5 We do not imply that other macroeconomic modeling in this vein is immune to this criticism: in fact, the problem 
may be quite pervasive, as suggested to us by Deepak Lal. Nevertheless, our focus in this paper is the Indian case, 
and LBP’s work has been the focus of considerable attention.  As we state later in this introduction, LBP’s policy 
discussion remains valuable, despite our taking issue with aspects of the formal modeling. 
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analyzing the puzzles noted above.  No such model is available in the literature, nor did we 
provide one in our paper.  Nevertheless, we argued that the facts are consistent with the climate 
for private corporate investment having worsened since 1996-97.  Thus, a rise in the fiscal deficit 
and fall in interest rates and inflation are consistent with a rise in foreign capital inflow, 
unchanged or even a rise in household financial saving, and a fall in private investment.  In this 
paper we develop some formal intertemporal models that begin to provide a coherent framework. 
A limitation remains in that we do not incorporate money into these intertemporal models: 
nevertheless, growth, investment and deficit issues can be more clearly analyzed along the lines 
that we present, than in past discussions of India’s macroeconomic situation. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we re-examine the sterilization and 
absorption issues raised by LBP, in a more clearly specified monetary model, albeit a static one. 
In Section 3, we present several illustrative theoretical models, which examine growth, deficits 
and investment, without the complication of money. Section 4 concludes. We also discuss some 
additional analytical and empirical issues arising from the LBP paper, in Appendix 1.  
Note that the models we present here may be helpful as coherent analytical foundations 
for a future econometric exercise.  However, we should hasten to add that these models are very 
simple, and even simplistic, and address analytically only some, and not all, of the relevant 
issues.  Our intention in presenting them is to encourage others to attempt building and 
estimating more satisfactory and complete models. Finally, many of our criticisms of LBP are 
applicable to much of the literature on the issues of crowding out, inflation and exchange rate 
effects of fiscal deficits and capital inflows.  But these criticisms should in no way be deemed as 
our lack of appreciation of the LBP paper, particularly its section on policy implications, which 
we found to be very rich and informative. 
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2.  Absorption, Sterilization and Crowding Out  
We noted earlier that the real and monetary models of LBP are not integrated, and the 
decisions of consumers regarding the demand for money and other nominal assets have no 
influence on their real consumption decisions.  We show here that incorporating consumer 
demand for money makes a difference in determining the impacts on relative prices and 
inflation, of the decision to let real external flows be absorbed or not.  We also argue that 
sterilization is not equivalent to non-absorption:  the former is neutralizing the monetary impact 
of foreign capital inflows, and the latter is preventing their impact on real flows of goods.
6 
Our model with an explicit demand for money is based on a simple static version of the 
Australian dependent economy model used by LBP.  It has three goods, an import good, an 
export good, and a non-traded good.  The demand for money is determined as a proportional 
transaction demand, and is therefore tied to the real economy, as one would expect.
7 There is no 
bond market, so sterilization of foreign inflows by selling bonds is not an option in this model. 
Indeed, this structure emphasizes our distinction between sterilization and non-absorption. We 
discuss sterilization separately, after analyzing the formal model. 
                                                 
6 We make this point in the context of our behavioral model – a different point underlies Joshi and Sanyal’s (2004) 
accounting-based critique of LBP’s analysis of the growth costs of reserve accumulation. They note that sterilization 
over the period analyzed was far from complete, and that “Capital and remittance inflows were absorbed, except to 
the extent of (sterilized) foreign exchange accumulation.” (p. 11) However, Joshi and Sanyal’s treatment of 
monetary policy responses to inflows gets closer to our argument. See also the discussion in our Appendix 1. 
7 This is just one way in which money demand can be modeled. Two standard alternatives are to put money in the 
utility function, and to impose a cash-in-advance constraint. For example, van Wijnbergen (1991) uses the former 
strategy, in a model with a single consumption good, domestic money, and foreign bonds. There is no trade in real 
goods, and openness just impacts intertemporal consumption through borrowing and saving decisions. As an 
example of the latter approach, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) have a simple cash-in-advance constraint 
on consumption purchases, and this is very similar in effect to a transaction demand as we model it. Their model is 
also one with a single consumption good, and intertemporal allocation, with openness just allowing borrowing and 
lending. Thus, there is no real trade in either model. In contrast, our model is static, but allows for trade in real 
goods, as does the model of LBP. Unlike LBP or Lal (1989), we relate the demand for money to nominal 
expenditures, and do not graft on a separate intertemporal model in our illustrative exercise. To this extent, our 
model is more coherent and integrated than LBP’s. 
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For simplicity, suppose there is no domestic production (consumption) of an import 
substitute (export good).  The economy is a small open economy, which takes world prices 
(normalized to unity, in some world numéraire, say, dollars, by choice of units of measurement) 
as parametrically given.  Then, under free trade, the prices in domestic currency (rupee) of a unit 
of the export good and the import good equal e , the nominal exchange rate (rupees per dollar).  
Let  N p  be the domestic currency price of the non-traded good.  Let F  be the vector of 
inelastically supplied domestic factors of production.  Let factors be internationally immobile.  
Then under profit maximization and pure competition we can write the supply functions SX and 
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 where   is total expenditure on commodities in rupees.  E
Demand for money 
d M  in this economy is for transactions only so that  
 
d M E λ =  (2.1) 
Suppose the private sector of this economy receives a gift of   dollars from abroad. G
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Consider two alternative ways, A and B, of using this gift. 
A:  Government buys the dollar gift from the private sector at the going exchange rate  , with 
newly created money, and adds   dollars to its reserves (in other words, G is not absorbed). 
e
G
B:  The private sector uses   dollars to buy import good, i.e., G is absorbed.  G
In Case A, the money supply M  in the economy goes up by eG  and the dollars to buy 
imports are generated by sale of exports.  In Case B, money supply remains at its pre-gift level 
                                                 
8 We will treat external capital inflow as a gift in this paper so that we can ignore the debt service (profit 
repatriation) implications of foreign borrowing (direct and portfolio investment). 
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M , but the finance for imports goes up by G  dollars over export earnings.  The market 
equilibrium conditions in the two cases (i = A, B) 
d
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Now, including its expenditure on acquisition of money, the total expenditure of the 
private sector (for simplicity, there is no taxing or spending by the government) is ( :  
Resources available for financing this expenditure is the sum of initial money stock 
) 1 i E λ +
M  and 
income from sales of the output of the export and non-trade goods (as well as the gift G ).  
Equating total expenditure with resources available for financing it we get: 
() 1 N N E M p S eG λ += +   +       ( 2 . 7 )  
  XN Ee Sp S  +  (2.8A)  N
 () BX N SGp S   ++  (2.8B)  N
Since   is also the expenditure on the imported and non-traded good, we get:  i E
 
 ,, iI N N Ee Dp DiA B = +    =  (2.9) 
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Equations (2.8), (2.9), and (2.5) imply (2.6).  This is nothing but Walras Law.  Thus, we need 
only two market equilibrium conditions, say (2.4) and (2.5). 
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From (2.2) and (2.4) we get: 
  A EM e λ =+ G  (2.12) 







λ =+  (2.13) 
Denoting  RA M  as real money stock and ERA as real expenditure (both in terms of non-
traded goods), we get 
  RA RA RA EMe λ =+ G  (2.14) 
Dividing both sides of (2.8A) by  N p  we get: 
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  (; ) (; RA RA X RA N RA Ee S e F S e F ) =    +   (2.8A)′ 
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Note that neither depends on G since in Case A, the gift G is not absorbed. 
Using these in (2.14), we solve for the equilibrium real money stock 
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We note from (2.16) and (2.17) that nominal prices are proportional to the initial money 













 so that nominal prices are increasing functions of the foreign 
gift  .  However, since e  and   are functions only of  G
*
RA E F  and not of G, relative price of the 
traded good and real expenditure are unaffected by G .  Thus, as long as the government adds the 
gift   to its reserves, and does not allow it to be absorbed in the economy, there is no real 




Now consider Case B.  Dividing both sides of (2.8B) by  N p  we get: 
 () RB RB X N Ee S G S = ++ (2.8)′′ 
Equation (2.5) in this case is: 
                                                 
9 One might phrase this as a case of nominal absorption without any real absorption, and the outcome is obvious 
once the model is written down and analyzed completely. Conflating these two possibilities seems to a source of 
confusion in some of this literature. 
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  (; ) (, ) IR B R B XR B De E S e F G   =  +  (2.5)′′ 
Equations (2.2) and (2.4) yield: 
  B EM λ =        or 
  RB RB EM λ =  
Now (2.5)  and (2.8  together solve for equilibrium value e  and  .  However, 
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Once again, the nominal values are proportional to M . 
Since the gift G  adds to the supply of imports as well as to the total expenditure of 
imports and non-traded goods, it has both a substitution effect in domestic production towards 
non-traded goods and real expenditure effects.  Naturally, the full impact on the equilibrium real 
exchange rate e  and real expenditure on   would depend on various demand and supply 
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absolute value of the elasticity of demand for imports with 
respect to e .  Clearly, it is positive. 
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the absolute value of the elasticity of the supply of non-traded 
goods with respect to the real exchange rate.  It can be assumed to be positive. 
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The denominator of (2.18)  is positive.  Since  ′ IX DSG = + ,  1
I D
G
> .  By assumption 
0 β >  and if imports are elastic with respect to real expenditure,  1 β > .  Thus, if η, the elasticity 
of equilibrium real expenditure is positive and not too low  0 δ >  so that the real exchange rate 
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depreciates.  If  0 η ≤ , then  0 δ <  and the real exchange rate appreciates.  However η, being an 
equilibrium value, has to be solved for and substituted in (2.18)′ for determining the effect of the 
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Substituting for η from (2.23) in (2.18)′, we get: 
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     (2.24) 
 
Clearly if  1 β <  and α β > , then  0 δ < .  Thus, if the demand for imports is inelastic with 
respect for real expenditure and the price elasticity of import demand exceeds its real expenditure 
elasticity, then  0 δ <  or the real exchange rate appreciates as the gift G is absorbed.  On the 
other hand, if α >Max (1,β ), it follows from (2.23) that  0 η >  but the sign of δ  is ambiguous.  
Thus, unlike the case of no absorption of the gift in which the gift has only an inflationary effect, 
full absorption of the gift has ambiguous real (and also nominal) effects in general.  The precise 
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effect becomes an empirical issue, depending on the magnitude of various demand elasticities. 
Thus we have shown that incorporating money into the real Australian model, even in a static 
framework, changes some aspects of the analysis significantly. The real and nominal aspects of 
the economy cannot first be analyzed in isolation and then combined ex post. 
  Turning to the nature of sterilization and its impact on crowding out, note that LBP 
compare monetization of fiscal deficits with sterilization of capital inflows, and claim that “as 
with capital inflow that is sterilized, a fiscal deficit that is not monetized will leave the real 
exchange rate unchanged, but reduce investment, the growth of the capital stock, and the growth 
rate” (LBP 2003, p. 4967).  This is misleading.  An exogenous foreign gift adds to the resources 
available to the economy.  Sterilization is equivalent to two operations by the RBI:  first, it 
purchases the gift with money creation, and then it absorbs the newly created money through the 
sale of government securities it owns.
10  Sterilization thus affects the composition of the RBI’s 
balance sheet (i.e., it swaps its domestic assets in the form of government securities for foreign 
assets of equal value).  Government securities are liabilities of the government regardless of 
whether they are held by RBI or others to whom RBI sells them.  As such, in a consolidated 
balance sheet of the government and RBI, liabilities are unaffected by the swap, and the asset 
side is larger by the amount of the foreign gift.  If the RBI did not sterilize its newly created 
money, its non-interest bearing currency liabilities would go up by the value of foreign gift it 
buys.  In a consolidation, non-interest bearing liabilities and assets go up by the same amount.   
  Leaving aside the sources of fiscal deficit, its financing by monetization adds to non-
interest bearing liabilities of the government, while bond-financing adds to its interest bearing 
liabilities.  But there is no change in assets, as in the case of a foreign gift.  However, by 
                                                 
10 Note particularly that in the formal model considered earlier in this section, the second step is not available to the 
government. In case A of that analysis, money is injected into the economy through the government’s purchase of 
the gift, but this has no real effect, only a nominal impact. 
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assuming that fiscal deficit results in an increase in the current account deficit, which is financed 
by a reduction in foreign currency reserves in the case of its monetization, LBP in effect reduce 
the money supply, thus swapping what otherwise would have been an increase in domestic 
liabilities to an equivalent decrease in foreign assets.  On the other hand, if the private savings-
investment balance shifts to accommodate the fiscal deficit, this swap need not occur.  In any 
case, since there is no net addition to assets regardless of the mode of financing the fiscal deficit, 
comparison of financing deficits with sterilization or otherwise of capital inflow is inappropriate.  
Bond financing leads to crowding out of private investment in the LBP analysis, while 
monetization of deficits does not.  This is presumably because in the latter case, the assumed 
mode of adjustment to fiscal deficits is a fall in reserves and not in the private savings-
investment balance, whereas in the former case, it is the private savings-investment balance that 
adjusts.  Hence, the growth effects of alternative ways of financing differ because of this 
assumption.  In the case of capital inflows, the growth or welfare effects differ depending on 
whether the inflow is absorbed or not, and not from whether it was sterilized. 
  In any case, the issue of absorption of capital inflow is, in principle, separable from the 
issue of sterilization.  Absorption involves the use of the additional resources from the inflow for 
financing additional imports.  In the real model, in the case in which the government “buys” the 
inflow through a tax transfer and “stores” it, no additional imports come in.  But, if instead one 
were to assume that the government uses the inflow it bought for public consumption, and if the 
government’s utility function were the same as that of the private sector, the equilibrium would 
be the same as if the government did not buy the inflows.  Going beyond the model, the 
government’s prepayment of part of its external debt from reserves can be viewed as absorption:  
instead of absorbing it so as to raise domestic investment (i.e., increase domestic assets 
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regardless of whether they are privately or publicly owned), it reduced its external debt.  If the 
return on domestic investment is no higher than that on foreign debt, such absorption is 
appropriate. 
 
3.  Growth, Investment and Deficits 
In this section, we illustrate the analytics of fiscal deficits and their financing, crowding out, 
savings and investment through a series of four growth models. Unlike the static model 
considered in Section 2, there is no money in these models. This allows us to focus on the growth 
and deficit implications of different assumptions on savings and investment behavior. The 
central point is that growth and government deficits are both determined endogenously by more 
fundamental assumptions on savings and investment behavior. It is precisely such features that 
are absent from models such as those of van Wijnbergen (1991) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and 
Rebelo (2001),
11 which consider intertemporal consumption and foreign borrowing, but without 
any role for either private or public investment. This modeling strategy appears to be quite 
common, allowing consideration of some implications of fiscal deficits, but not those highlighted 
in our models. 
 
Model I  
This is a Harrod-Domar model with firms, households and government. Subscripts used 
are ‘g’ for ‘government’, ‘p’ for private sector’, and ‘h’ for ‘households’. Only households save, 
while the private sector and government both invest. The behavioral equations and equilibrium 
are quite simple. Y stands for GDP, and there is no interest rate. Savings are a constant fraction 
of GDP, and the sign and magnitude of λ in the private investment demand equation reflect 
                                                 
11 See footnote 7 for a brief discussion of these two papers. 
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whether, and the extent to which, public investment crowds in or crowds out private investment. 
The parameters βp and βg are the constant marginal products of capital, or reciprocals of the 
sectoral ICORs, and Kp and Kg are the corresponding capital stocks. 
Savings  S = shY  (3.1)
Private Investment Demand  Ip = λIg + µY  (3.2)
Investment Finance  S  (3.3)
Investment Equilibrium  Ip + Ig = S  (3.4)
Solving these equations:  Ig = [(sh - µ)/(1 + λ)]Y  (3.5)
and  Ip = [λ(sh - µ)/(1 + λ) + µ]Y   (3.6)
We assume that sh - µ > 0, or the marginal propensity to save out of income exceeds the 
private marginal propensity to invest. This ensures that government investment is positive in the 
above equilibrium. Note that here government investment passively soaks up savings not 
absorbed by the private sector. 
Output is given by  Y = βpKp + βgKg   (3.7)
Hence, the equilibrium growth rate is  
  g = (βpIp + βgIg)/Y  (3.8)
     = [βp(λsh + µ) + βg(sh - µ)]/(1 + λ)  (3.9)
Finally,   ∂g/∂λ = (βp - βg)(sh - µ)/(1 + λ)
2  (3.10)
As long as βp > βg, and given sh - µ > 0, the last expression is positive, as one would 
expect. In fact, as λ → ∞, Ig  → 0 and g → βpsh, which is the maximal growth rate.  
To relate this model to the issue of crowding out effects of fiscal deficits, note that the 
government deficit in the model is given by  
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  D = Ig - T   (3.11)
where T is tax revenue, and is simply a transfer from households to the government. If T = 0, 
then the deficit is simply the government’s investment. In that case, equation (3.5) is also the 
government deficit in equilibrium. Both the deficit and the growth rate are determined 
endogenously, and what is relevant for determining their correlation is the movement of the 
underlying parameters. Thus, an increase in λ reduces the deficit, but increases the growth rate. 
On the other hand, an increase in   increases private and public investment and, hence, the 
growth rate in equilibrium.  However, since public investment is the same as the deficit, an 
increase in   increases the deficit. 
h s
h s
If T > 0, it may be more realistic to model saving as coming out of disposable income. 
Furthermore, we can assume that tax revenue has some buoyancy with respect to income: this is 
captured by the parameter b, so that T = bY. Our savings equation is modified as follows. 
Savings  S = sh (Y – T) = sh(1 – b)Y ≡ sh′Y (3.1)′
Thus, the parameter sh is simply replaced by sh′ in the remaining equations of the model. In this 
case, an increase in taxation, through an increase in b, simply reduces growth, because it reduces 
savings. At the same time, the equilibrium deficit is now given by 
  D = [(sh′ - µ)/(1 + λ) - b]Y   (3.11)′
Thus, the equilibrium deficit and the growth rate both decrease as b increases. 
 
Model II 
The above model lacks an interest rate mechanism for equilibrating savings and 
investment. Equilibrium is achieved through adjustments in government investment. 
Government investment expenditure crowds in through a technological assumption (λ > 0), but 
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there is no crowding out. Our second model is essentially a modification of the first that 
introduces the interest rate, and hence the possibility of endogenous crowding out. We allow 
somewhat more general functional forms. 
Savings  S = S(r, Y),  where Sr > 0, SY > 0  (3.1)″
Private Investment Demand  Ip = f(Ig)I(r),  where f′ > 0, I′ < 0  (3.2)″
Investment Finance  S(r, Y)  (3.3)″
Investment Equilibrium  f(Ig)I(r) + Ig = S(r, Y)  (3.4)″
Since Y is predetermined, (3.4)″determines combinations of Ig and r that are consistent 
with equilibrium. Ig can now be exogenous, with the interest rate serving to equilibrate savings 
and investment. Given the assumed standard responses of savings and investment to interest rate 
movements, it is easy to show that ∂r/∂Ig > 0, so that greater government investment is associated 
with higher interest rates. This represents the conventional crowding out effect. 
In fact,   ∂r/∂Ig = [f′I(r) + 1]/[ Sr - f(Ig)I′]  (3.12)
Hence, the growth rate is  g = (βpIp + βgIg)/Y (3.8)″
or using (3.4)″     = [βp(S(r, Y) - Ig) + βgIg]/Y (3.9)″
Finally,   Y∂g/∂Ig = -(βp - βg) + βp Sr∂r/∂Ig  (3.13)
In this case, we see that the growth implications of an increase in government investment 
are ambiguous, and depend on the relative efficiency of public and private investment, and the 
responses of savings and investment to interest rates, as well as the magnitude of any crowding 
in. Note that taxation in this model may now reduce crowding out, by reducing the government’s 
net demand for investment funds. This is in addition to the previous effect of reducing savings. 




We extend the previous approach by allowing for optimal savings and taxation, using a 
neoclassical model with two types of capital (public and private). This allows for a richer 
analysis. The labor force grows exogenously at the rate n, and the production function exhibits 
constant returns to scale. Public investment in this model is financed entirely by capital taxation, 
so there is no deficit: debt financing is considered in the next model. 
The social planner maximizes 
  ∫
∞ −
0 )) ( ( dt t c u e
t ρ   (3.14)
subject to   ) ( ) ( )] ( ), ( [ )] ( 1 [ t c t nk t k t k f t k p g p p − − − = τ &   (3.15)
  ) ( )] ( ), ( [ ) ( t nk t k t k f t k g g p g − =τ &   (3.16)
  and 0 1 τ ≤≤  
where   c(t): per worker consumption 
  ) ( ), ( t k t k g p : per worker capital stocks 
  ) (t τ : proportionate tax on capital 
  Maximizing the current value Hamiltonian   
  () () 1 pg H u c f nk c f nk λτ µ τ   =+−= − + −       (3.17)
  with respect to the control variable c and τ, we have the first order conditions  















  From (3.15) and (3.16) it follows that 
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  The equations of motion for the costate variables λ and µ are: 
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Along a steady state, noting that  µ λ = , one obtains 
  ρ + = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ n k k k f k k k f g g p p g p ) , ( ) , (
* * * *   (3.22)
  ] [ ) , (
* * * * *
g p g p k k n k k f c + − =   (3.23)
                                                 
12 This is analogous to the crowding in assumption in the first model, since a rise in public capital increases the 
marginal product of private capital, and hence encourages private investment. 
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  ) , (
* * * *
g p g k k f nk = τ   (3.24)
Thus we derive the optimal investment and consumption paths, as well as the associated 
optimal tax rate for financing public investment.  As is the case with neoclassical optimal growth 
models of this genre, the steady state levels of consumption, outputs, capital-labor ratios and the 
tax rates depend only on the pure rate of time preference and the rate of growth of the labor 
force.  Preferences and initial capital stocks matter only along the transition to the steady state. 
 
Model IV 
In this case, Model III is altered by replacing tax finance with debt finance. The steady 
state results are very similar, as one might expect. We will abbreviate the notation slightly where 
it is obvious. Here d  is the debt stock of the government per worker, r is the interest rate on 
debt, and −  is debt service (i.e., interest due on existing debt (rd )  s minus any gross additions 
 to debt per worker or equivalently,  dn d + & plus any gross repayment of debt per worker. 
The equations of motion are 
  () , () () () pp g p kf k t k tn k t c t  =− − 
& s −   (3.25)
  ) (t nk s k g g − = &   (3.26)
  () dsrn d =+ − &   (3.27)
  Once again, maximizing the current value Hamiltonian 
  () pg Hu c k k d λ µν =+++ &&&
 
(3.28)
with respect to the control variables   and  , we have the first order conditions  c s











so that   if  s →− ∞ λ µυ >+ 
                +  if  → ∞ λ µυ < +  
              if  s −∞ ≤ − ≤ +∞ λ µυ = +  
(3.30)
 Thus,  for  s to be finite, λ µυ =+ for all t, which in turn implies λ µυ =+ & && .   
The equations of motion for the three costate variables  , , λ µυ are:
 
 
  ] [ n k f k H p p − ∂ ∂ − = ∂ ∂ − = λ λρ λρ λ &   (3.31)
  µ λ µρ µρ µ n k f k H g g + ∂ ∂ − = ∂ ∂ − = &   (3.32)
  [ ] Hd rn νν ρ υ ρ =− ∂∂ = − + &   (3.33)
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One can interpret this as follows:  suppose we increase s by ε  by reducing   by  p k & ε  so 









 in terms of rate of output.  An increase of s by ε  raises 
g k &  by ε  and  g k .  It also increases   by  d & ε  and debt d by  dt ε .  The gain from the latter two 














⋅ .  Along the optimal path, the cost 
of raising s by  dt ε  and the gain from it have to be equal and this is what 3.34 implies. 
Consider the case where r > n+ρ. Then ν → 0 as t → ∞. Then it is clear that in the steady 
state (i.e.,  )  0 = = µ λ & &
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  g p k f k f n ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = + ρ   (3.35)
as in the tax financed case. 
If r < n+ρ, then ν → ∞ if  0 0 ≠ ν . 
Ruling out  0 ν =  for all t, the transversality condition requires 
  lim ( ) 0 t dt ν →∞ =   (3.36)
so that  lim ( ) 0 t dt →∞ =  since ν →∞  (3.37)
  Note that Models III and IV can be viewed as models of a small open economy that faces 
unchanging world relative prices of commodities and interest rates.  In Model III,  f  represents 
the maximized value at world prices of domestic output per worker, given   and  p k g k .  With the 
normalization that world prices of all commodities are unity, the addition of (3.14) and (3.15) 
implies that trade is balanced so that there is no international borrowing or lending.  Model IV 
differs from Model III is that international borrowing or lending at the world interest rate r  is 
allowed.
13 
Model IV could also be used to illustrate the implications of a gift z (in terms of world 
numéraire per worker per instant) to the private sector of the economy.
14  Assume that z is 
received either for a finite period 0  (Case A) or permanently, i.e., for all   (Case B).  
In effect, the gift adds z to the value of output per worker, i.e., 
tT ≤≤ 0 t ≥
( , ) pg f kk at world prices.  Thus 
(3.25) is changed to: 
                                                 
13 To see this, suppose that all borrowing is from abroad. Now s is net receipts (new borrowing minus interest 
payments) from abroad, calculated per worker. Let m be the value of imports per worker and x be the value of 
exports per worker, both at world prices.  Then gdp + imports ≡ consumption +investment + exports or: 
() () pg pg f mc k k n k k x += + + + + + &&
( pg pg mx fck k n k k ≡− = − + +++ + &&
, or current account deficit 
 capital account surplus. A full open economy version of the 
model, with both domestic and foreign borrowing can also be developed. See Appendix 2. 
) s = =
14 In the context of macroeconomic policy for India, the gift can be interpreted as remittances from abroad. 
27  
 (,) pp g p kz f k kn kc s = +− − & −  (3.38) 
for 0  in Case A and for all   in Case B.  The other constraints, (3.26) and (3.27), 
remain the same.   
tT ≤≤ 0 t ≥
Suppose the optimal choice of time paths for the control variables c and s for the case of 





, λ µ  
oo  and υ
o.  It is easy to see that a choice of  ˆ cc z = +
o  and  0 ˆ ss =  (for either 0 tT ≤ ≤  
in Case A or for all t  in Case B) with nothing else changed is feasible.  With such a choice, it 
is easily seen that  and 
0





g k   ˆ d d =
o.  Clearly, such a choice is not optimal:  were it to 
be optimal, a path   for the costate variable has to satisfy its equation of motion  ˆ λ ˆ () uc ′ =







=− − +  
∂    
&  (3.39) 
Obviously, with  ˆ
g g kk =
o  and  ˆ ˆ , pp kk λ =  
o  cannot satisfy this equation:  if it did, 
, which is not possible, as long as  ˆ ˆ () ( ) uc uc λλ ′ ≡= ≡
o ′
o 0 z ≠  and  ( ) u −  is strictly concave.  
Since such a policy is feasible, an optimal policy will yield a higher intertemporal welfare.  Thus, 
a policy of keeping   along their path of the case z=0 for   and adding the gift 
entirely to consumption is not optimal and yields a lower welfare.   
, kk , pg d    0 ≥ t
Consider an alternative policy of reducing debt accumulation, taxing away the reduction 
in debt service (i.e., prepayment of debt), and using the tax receipts for replacing debt-financed 
accumulation of public debt.  That is, let: 
  ˆ ssτ = −
o  (3.40) 
  ˆˆ ˆ pp kz f n kc τ ˆ s = +− − − − &  (3.41) 
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  ˆ ˆ ˆ
g g ks τ =+− & n k
ˆ
 (3.42) 
   (3.43)  ˆ ˆ () dsrn d =+ − &
where τ  is the lump sum tax per worker. 
It is obvious that cc
()(
0 ˆˆˆ ˆ ,,,
tr n u t
pp gg z k kk kdd e d t τ
) − − =+  = =  =− ∫
oo o o  satisfy (3.38) – (3.43), 
and hence, such a policy is feasible (for sufficiently small τ  so that  ).  Once again, it is not 
optimal so that using the gift to reduce debt service yields lower intertemporal welfare than an 
optimal policy.  It follows that 
ˆ 0 d ≥
in general, an optimal response to the gift, whether temporary or 
permanent, is to use it in part to raise consumption and in part to accumulate private or public 
capital as well as to prepay debt.  It is clear that if the gift is temporary, the steady state output 
and consumption are unaffected (see equation (3.35)), and if the gift is permanent, the gift adds 
to the value of output for all  , and in the steady state it will be added to consumption, since 
equation (3.35) implies that steady state capital stocks 
0 t ≥
** , pg kk    are unaffected. Thus, there is no 
presumption that a foreign inflow will all be absorbed as additional domestic investment. Note 
that, even if foreign inflows are earmarked for investment, domestic actors can engage in 




In this paper, we have argued that, in order to understand some of the puzzles in India’s 
current macroeconomic situation, a coherent intertemporal model is required, in which both 
private and public savings and investment behavior are behaviorally specified, and growth, 
government deficits, and other macroeconomic variables are determined in equilibrium. We have 
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also argued that if money is included in the model, which is required if one wishes to examine 
issues connected to sterilization of foreign inflows, it must be incorporated in a manner that 
recognizes interactions with the real side.  
We have illustrated the importance of coherent intertemporal modeling, as well as 
properly incorporating money, in separate illustrative models. Our goal has been to provide some 
starting points for further theoretical analysis, which could then be used for empirical work that 
could have policy relevance. Since much of the policy debate on India’s fiscal deficits, exchange 
rate management policy, and reserves management policy is either model-free, or uses ad hoc 
models, we believe that even our simple, illustrative models have some value in guiding future 
academic and policy discussion of India’s macroeconomic situation. In this respect, we are in 
agreement with the approach of Joshi and Sanyal (2004), who use a Mundell-Fleming model to 
provide an analytical basis for assessing India’s current macroeconomic situation and policy 
responses. Since the focus of the Mundell-Fleming model is on short run equilibria in goods, 
money and foreign exchange markets, our main focus on intertemporal models and growth can 
be seen as a complement to Joshi and Sanyal’s work, though we overlap in our treatment of 
several analytical and policy issues. 
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Appendix 1 – LBP Analysis:  A Critique 
  As we have discussed in the main paper, LBP use essentially two models, the 
Australian Dependent Economy real model of a small open economy, and a model involving 
nominal variables.  Furthermore, we noted that the real and monetary models of LBP are not 
integrated.  A second problem with their approach, as they themselves recognize, is that they do 
not have a full-fledged intertemporal model for the choice of paths of consumption, savings and 
investment (i.e., portfolio decision relating to the choice among real and nominal assets).  For 
example, they are aware that accounting identities equating current account surplus with the 
excess of savings over investment, and with the change in net foreign assets less capital inflows, 
in and of themselves cannot tell anything about adjustments to, say, an exogenous change in 
capital inflows.  What, among an infinite number of combinations of savings, investment, 
exports, imports, remittances, etc., needed to accommodate the change in capital inflows would 
be chosen cannot be inferred from the identities.  One needs an intertemporal model integrating 
nominal and real decisions and which obviously has relevant interest and discount rates (not to 
mention stochastic shocks) to do a satisfactory analysis.  Without such a model, LBP in effect 
assume particular combinations of adjustment.  Naturally, they disavow anything other than 
illustrative significance to their empirical exercise.  In our view, leaving aside several problems 
with the empirics, including their regressing one endogenous variable (the real exchange rate) on 
another (excess demand), the problem is much deeper. It is the lack of coherence between 
nominal and real models and the absence of a forward-looking framework for intertemporal 
decisions.   
  A third and last problem is that although the models are meant to illustrate the choice 
among alternative government policies of sterilization, bond financing and monetization, etc., 
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LBP do not specify a government objective function describing the trade off among different 
consequences (i.e., inflation, crowding out, growth) of alternative policy choices.  This is 
understandable given the fact government objective functions specified in various political 
economy models of the literature are crude! 
  Turning to the Australian model, there is a relatively minor error in the discussion by 
LBP of the model and its illustration in their Figure I.
15 As long as there is a non-zero tax or 
subsidy on traded goods, their domestic prices and world prices would differ, and the 
consumption point will not be on the production possibility frontier, since consumption 
expenditures would differ from the value of output by the net revenue from trade taxes or 
subsidies, LBP do not allow for this fact.
16  We do so in our Figure 1, which assumes, for 
simplicity only, that the export (import) good is not consumed (produced) at home.  Without loss 
of generality, the relative price of imports in terms of exports in world markets is assumed to be 
unity by choice of units of measurement of the two commodities.  Assume that there is an ad 
valorem tariff at the rate   on imports.  One could have equivalently assumed an ad valorem tax 
on exports, as we know from the Lerner symmetry theorem.  Let the non-taxed export good be 
the numéraire.  At the initial equilibrium, output of non-traded goods is   and of exports 
t
0 N 0
w X .  
Under balanced trade at world prices, exports of  0
w X  buys  0
w
0
w M X =  of imports.  In the domestic 














.  At   the domestic production possibility 
frontier   (relating efficient production of exportable to non-tradables) is tangential to 
0 S
00 PP′
                                                 
15 As we note in the introduction, this error does not affect the value of the policy discussion in LBP. 
16 Also, they depict the capital inflow as a parallel shift in the budget line, thus measuring it in units of domestic 
price based composite of traded goods.  This does not square with the balance of trade constraint that the inflow 
enables the economy to finance more imports at world prices than it earns from its exports, again at world prices. 
33  
domestic price line YY 00 ′.  With trade balanced, the output of exports ( ) 0
w X  associated with   is 





w M X =  units of imports.  The demand   then is the same 
as the supply at   in 
0 D
0 S physical units.  From a consumer utility maximization perspective, the 
indifference curve through   touches the price line for consumers,  0 D 00 EE ′, which has a slope of 
the domestic relative price of non-tradables in terms of imports.  This depiction of equilibrium 
assumes that the tariff revenue YE in terms of exports is returned to consumers in a lump sum 








O 1 ˆ D
F
  Suppose now private consumers in the economy receive a gift of   units in terms of 
exports.  If the domestic relative price of non-tradable (the export real exchange rate) is 
unchanged, production will continue to be at  , but consumers now have  0 D F +
S
 to spend on 
imports so that supply point shifts to  .  However, if the tariff rate remains unchanged, the 
relative price of importable will not change, and if preferences are homothetic, the demand point 
will move   on the ray from the origin   connecting it to  .  Thus, comparing   with  , 
there is an excess demand for non-tradables and an excess supply of non-tradables.  With the 
tariff rate remaining at t, for bringing about an equilibrium, the relative price of non-tradables 
has to increase, so that both the export and import real exchange rates appreciate by the same 
proportion.  Clearly, consumer welfare at the new equilibrium will be higher than at the initial 
equilibrium, assuming that both goods are normal in consumption.  This is the case, to use the 
LBP terminology, of full absorption in the domestic economy of the gift  .  LBP talk about 
alternative mechanisms for bringing about such an equilibrium, such as a rise in the 
1 ˆ D 0 D 1
nominal 
price of non-tradable or a rise in the nominal exchange rate.  There are no nominal variables in 
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this model.  As such, these mechanisms are not applicable.  In any case, the analysis being 
comparative-static, i.e., comparison of two equilibria, the question of dynamic mechanisms for 
moving from one equilibrium to the other is left open.  For example, a Walrasian auctioneer 
could be added and the standard relative price adjustment story can be told.  But no nominal 
magnitudes would be involved in the story. 
  We noted earlier that in the real model there can be no analogue of sterilization of the 
monetary impact of the gift through an open market operation using nominal bonds.  However, 
the model is eminently suitable for analyzing policies relating to the absorption of the gift.  For 
example, the government can prevent its absorption by imposing real taxation, as LBP recognize.  
Imagine that the government, instead of returning tariff revenue in a lump fashion to consumers, 
uses a part of it to buy   at the initial domestic price of imports, which is in fact their 
opportunity cost to consumers (if the cost of   exceeds tariff revenue, the balance is made up by 
lump sum taxation).  The net effects of this operation are two (i) the government acquires  , 
which is no longer available to buy imports (ii) consumers on the one hand receive (  from 
their sale of   to government, but lose a part of the lump sum transfers they originally received 
or all of it and pay additional lump sum taxes.  But, and this is the important point, this operation 




F 1 ) t +
F
00 EE ′ so that they consume at 
.  Thus, government gets   (and adds it on to reserves) and production, consumption as well 
as relative prices remain at their initial equilibrium values.  It is evident that in this static real 
model, not allowing the external gift to be absorbed has the effect of keeping welfare at its initial 
level and not letting it rise. 
0 D F
  While the Australian model focuses on the role of real exchange rates as an equilibrating 
variable, these rates are strictly not necessary for a discussion of the welfare implications of 
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absorption.  For this purpose, the conventional two traded goods model will do.  However, in 
such a model, the relative price of importable in terms of exportable does not change whether or 
not the gift is absorbed.  The reason is that, for a small open economy, the world relative price is 
given and does not change, and the domestic relative price does not change either, given the 
unchanged tariff.  Thus, in Figure 2, the initial production point is at   where the domestic tariff 
inclusive relative price line  .  A gift   shifts supply at unchanged domestic prices to   
and demand to   (given homothetic tastes) where   and   are on the world price lines 
, which is parallel to  .  This is the case of full absorption.  Welfare at   is higher 
than at  .  The government can prevent absorption by using all, as in the earlier case, or part of 
tariff revenue and any additional lump sum taxes to buy   at domestic prices, leaving 















  Clearly, the static version of the Australian real model is not suitable for deriving growth 
implications of not absorbing the gift and sterilization.  LBP use an ad hoc procedure of 
assuming, for illustrative purposes, that the part of capital inflow that is allowed to be absorbed 
in any year will be added to investment that year and hence raise the capital stock the next year.  
This is somewhat puzzling—if the consumer’s budget line is shifted by the full value of inflow 
absorbed, as LBP seem to be doing in their Figure 1, there cannot be any increase in investment 
due to the absorbed inflow.  In any case, their assumption does not allow the differences in the 
time path of the real exchange rates (depending on whether inflows are being sterilized) to 




It is difficult to evaluate the empirical estimates of LBP—for example, the description of 
the static model in their Appendix II (A) does not make clear whether the variables are in 
logarithms or absolute values—since the difference PN PT −  in equation A.1 makes sense only 
if   and   represent the logarithm of the price of non-traded and traded goods.  Whereas in 
the growth case (their Appendix II (B)), both labor and capital are factors of production, in 
Appendix II (A) the wage rate enters the supply equation for non-tradables but not the rental rate 
for capital.  In a two commodity model with inelastically supplied factors, it is enough to have 
relative commodity prices and aggregate factor endowments in the supply equations.  But LBP 
do not take that route.  In any case, unless some restrictions are placed on the parameters  ,   . 
. . b , b  . . . equations A1 to A7 would not be mutually consistent.  Finally, in equation A1 for 
the demand for non-traded goods, money supply relative to money demand appears.  It is hard to 
see the reason why it appears only in the demand for non-traded good.  Again, since LBP seem 
to combine a real and monetary model without integrating them and it is also hard to see how the 
extent of crowding out of private investment was estimated, we cannot evaluate whether the 
illustrative numbers follow from a logically coherent set up. In addition to these points, we note 
that Joshi and Sanyal (2004) have argued that the LBP method for estimating forgone investment 
is logically flawed. Thus, even though the authors stress that their empirical exercise is only 
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Appendix 2: Model IV with Foreign and Domestic Debt 
Foreign debt can be accommodated by extending Model IV.  We do so first in absolute terms, 
and then in per worker terms.  In the following, we view the government as financing its 
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investment by borrowing B
D in the domestic capital market and B
F from the foreign capital 
market, at an interest rate r (which is viewed as administratively set in a pure domestic debt 
context or by world capital market, if there is foreign borrowing) and taxing the private sector an 
amount T for interest payments  ( ) rD  on domestic (D D +
D) and foreign (D
F) debt.  Interest on 
domestic debt accrues as income to the private sector which also finances the government’s 









g KBB =+ &  (A2) 
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Eliminating T using (3) in (1) we get: 
 
 
P PF B KF C r D += − − &  (A1)′ 
 
In per worker terms, these can be written as: 
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 ()
D D dbr n d =+ − & D  (A4)O 
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 ()  (A5)O 
FF dbr n d =+ − & F
 
 
It is clear that if there is no foreign borrowing so that  0
FF db = =  for all t, the model reduces to 
Model IV once one sets 
D s .  One can write the relevant Hamiltonian and do the optimization 
for the case with foreign and domestic borrowing with c, b
b =
D, b
F as control variables and kp, kg, d
D 
and d
F as state variables.   
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